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Enacted into law in 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides 
thousands of homeowners, businessowners, and communities with insurance in the event of 
a flood. The program goals are to provide primary flood insurance and funding for 
mitigation activities. Presently, the program is over $20 billion in debt with a probable 
maximum annual loss of $40 billion. On May 31, 2019 the current funding authorization for 
the program is due to expire and be reduced to $1 billion.  
As climate change affects weather patterns and the severity of storms and physical 
development changes landscapes, they also increase exposure to flood risk. To manage 
future debt and adapt to a changing climate, Congress needs to bolster mitigation efforts by 
increasing support for flood mitigation activities. Floodplain management, repairs to 
repetitive loss properties, improved mapping, and ongoing support for comprehensive, 
community-level risk management would reduce flood-related disasters. A revolving loan 
fund for flood mitigation could achieve these aims. Creating a loan fund would increase 
consumer awareness of flood risk, reduce damage after major flood events, and increase 
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Action Forcing Event 
February 11, 2019, the state of Mississippi sued the federal government for $25 
million due to the rerouting of the Mississippi of the Old River Control Structure in 
Louisiana.1 They contend it amounts to a taking of land because landowner’s property is 
rendered useless through flooding. The case highlights the need for reforms to the National 
Flood Insurance Program to address issues of land and water rights, access to clean water, 
and increased flood risk. 
Statement of the problem  
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is an increasingly unsustainable 
program to subsidize flood insurance for consumers across the United States. Authorized in 
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, the program had remained solvent throughout 
most of its over 50-year history. Population increases in coastal areas, outdated flood zone 
mapping, low take-up rates, lack of consumer education, and increased instances of extreme 
rain and flood events in the period following its inception have underscored weaknesses in 
the program’s original design. Of the 1,743 Presidential Disaster Declarations between 1980 
and 2017, over 80% were “tied to floods and flood-related events such as hurricanes and 
severe storms.”2 As the effects of climate change  affect weather patterns, “climate-induced 
                                                     




2 Kunreuther, Howard, et al. 2018. “Flood Risk and the U.S. Housing Market” University of Pennsylvania - Risk 





changes in rainfall patterns are projected to lead to increasing flooding in certain parts of the 
United States.”3 The current configuration of the NFIP is not adaptable enough to absorb 
the increase in flood events expected to occur with climate change.  
The current authorization of the NFIP is due to expire on May 31, 2019. Presently, 
the NFIP may borrow up to $30.425 billion from Treasury.4 That total amount is due to 
decrease to $1 billion when the current authorization expires on May 31, 2019. As a result of 
natural disasters beginning with Hurricane Katrina, Congress increased the NFIP’s 
borrowing authorization from Treasury and once canceled its debt.  
After Hurricane Katrina, the NFIP was $18 billion in debt and had its borrowing cap 
raised to $20.775 billion.5  In 2016, the NFIP owed Treasury over $20 billion in debt without 
a means of repaying it in the near-term.6 The following year, Congress " canceled $16 billion 
of NFIP debt, making it possible for the program to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, 
Irma, and Maria."7 While Congress raised the NFIP’s borrowing authority in 2012 and 2014, 
the unusual move in 2016 to cancel its debt marked a new low in the program’s history. As 
of January 2019, the program had approximately $9.9 billion of borrowing authority.8 As of 
first quarter 2019,  the program has an estimated annual loss of more than $40 billion and 
                                                     
3  11155 ■ University of Pennsylvania - Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, 2018a), 1482.  
4 Michael Campana, "CRS Report: 'Introduction to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),'" ACI 
Information Group, http://scholar.aci.info/view/14b08e8e9b200150009/15db4a6393b0001d00788c7  
5 Scott Gabriel Knowles and Howard C. Kunreuther, "Troubled Waters: The National Flood Insurance 
Program in Historical Perspective," Journal of Policy History 26, no. 3 (2014), 327-353. 
doi:10.1017/S0898030614000153. 
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6 Carolyn Kousky, Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood Insurance Program,[2017]).  






over $20 billion of debt with Treasury.9 Interest payments to Treasury are greater than $400 
million per year.10 The chart below shows the financial position of the NFIP as of Q1 2019: 
Chart 1 NFIP Key Figures in Q1 201911 
Item Total 
Insurance in Force $1.3 trillion 
Probable Maximum Annual Loss $40 billion 
Average Annual Premium $701 
Outstanding Debt to Treasury $20.5 billion 
Interest Paid since Katrina $4.2 billion 
 
As the chart above demonstrates, massive debt coupled with inadequate borrowing authority 
create a bleak financial future for the NFIP. Annual premiums remain low to encourage 
consumers to purchase them. However, they do not cover the actual price of the program. 
Increased occurrences of high-cost flood events diminish the ability of the NFIP to provide 
adequate relief. 
Accurate flood mapping and consumer take-up rates are two critical factors affecting 
the future solvency of the program. Due to the structure of the program, the "NFIP's debt is 
conceptually owed by current, and future participants...as the insurance program itself owes 
the debt to the Treasury and pays for accruing interest on that debt through the premium 
revenues of policyholders."12 Outdated mapping data and methods used for flood mapping 
                                                     
9 Federal Emergency Management Administration, Federal Insurance & Mitigation Administration (2019). The 









prevent consumers from accurately assessing their flood risk and purchasing flood insurance 
or taking other flood prevention or mitigation precautions.  
In 2013, Highfield, Norman, and Brody discussed ways in which how flood risk is 
communicated influences consumer and policymaker risk perception. The 100-Year 
floodplain metric first came into use in 1973 and was used to convey flood risk. The term is 
commonly misunderstood as a flood that will occur once in 100 years. However, it means 
there is a 1% chance a flood of a particular magnitude will occur in a given year. 
Homeowner's with a 30-year mortgage have a 25% chance that they will experience a flood 
of that magnitude in 30 years. As climate change creates more extreme flood events and 
development changes the landscape13, the probability of flooding increases. 
Consumer misperceptions about risk and rising costs of the NFIP converge on 
repetitive loss properties. Repetitive loss properties are “any insurable building or which two 
or more claims of more than $1,000 were paid by the NFIP within any rolling 10-year period 
since 1978.”14 Severe repetitive loss properties “are those for which the program has either 
made at least four payments for buildings and/or contents of more than $5,000 or at least 
two building- only payments that exceeded the value of the property.”15 The map below 
shows where FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant programs are funding projects 
across the country and the number of projects in each state.  
 
 
                                                     
13 Samuel D. Brody and Wesley E. Highfield, "Open Space Protection and Flood Mitigation: A National 
Study," Land Use Policy 32 (May, 2013), 89-95. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.10.017. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837712002050.  
14 Ibid 189. 








Use of the 100-year floodplain boundaries can limit the ability of a community to assess its 
risk. A large percentage of repetitive losses from floods occur outside Special Flood Hazard 
Area boundaries17Since flood risk is commonly communicated as binary, consumers and 
policymakers do not fully understand their true exposure to risk. Repetitive loss properties 
are growing by about 5,000 properties per year and cost the NFIP over $12.5 billion.18 They 
account for roughly 1% of NFIP policies and 25-30% of flood claims.19 
                                                     
16 Federal Emergency Management Administration. OpenFEMA Dataset: Hazard Mitigation Assistance 
Projects -V1. Public Use data file and documentation. https://www.fema.gov/openfema-dataset-hazard-
mitigation-assistance-projects-v1. November 2018. 
17 Brody and Highfield, "Open Space Protection and Flood Mitigation: A National Study," Land Use Policy 32 
(May, 2013), 89-95. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.10.017. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264837712002050.  







Despite the prevalence of floods, consumers often consider their flood risk in binary 
terms and fail to recognize their actual exposure to risk.  Several cognitive biases affect 
consumer risk perception, resulting in a failure to purchase flood insurance.  They include 
myopia, amnesia, optimism, inertia, simplification and herding listed in the table below: 
“1. Myopia  The tendency to focus on overly short future time horizons when 
appraising immediate costs and the potential benefits of protective 
investments.  
2. Amnesia  The tendency to quickly forget the lessons of past disasters.  
3. Optimism  The tendency to underestimate the likelihood that losses will occur from 
future hazards.  
4. Inertia  The tendency to maintain the status quo or adopt a default option when 
there is uncertainty about the potential benefits of investing in alternative 
protective measures.  
5.Simplification  A tendency to selectively attend to only a subset of the relevant facts to 
consider when making choices involving risk.  
6. Herding  The tendency to base choices on the observed actions of others.”20 
These cognitive biases primarily affect decision-making as more frequent extreme rain, and 
other weather events raise the risk of flood damage in areas historically unaffected by flood 
damage. Flood risk is most often considered in the wake of a significant flood without 
ongoing evaluation of risk over time. As amnesia suggests, people in areas affected by floods, 
unless they are severe, quickly forget lessons learned in the past. This failure to acknowledge 
risk among consumers and communities affects their ability to prepare for flood events 
adequately. Only "approximately 20 percent of homes in areas affected by Hurricane Harvey 
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had flood insurance.”21 This lack of preparation exposes individual consumers and their 
communities to more health, financial, and economic risks when disasters occur.   
History and Background 
Depression Era and Post-War Context 
A series of natural disasters during the interwar period and again in the early 1960s 
created the impetus to more thoroughly address the issues of disaster preparedness and 
floods. Throughout the period, a tension existed between how to define disasters and which 
members of society were genuinely worthy of aid from the Federal Government. The 
primary source of this tension was the perceived worthiness of the recipients, similarly to 
other welfare state programs, and their responsibility for their plight.  
During the interwar period, the economic disaster of the Depression spurred the 
government to expand government support for average citizens through the New Deal and 
the creation of the Social Security Administration among other initiatives. Roosevelt's sincere 
belief in the right of all citizens to pursue their full potential was outlined in his Second Bill 
of Rights. While he was not an egalitarian, he did promote programs, like those of the New 
Deal, that allowed people at all levels of society. The expansion of the welfare state in the 
interwar period and subsequent legislation, such as the GI Bill of 1944, changed the 
American understanding of the distinction between federal, private, and local aid. 
During the Cold War, much of disaster preparedness focused on nuclear war. Several 
natural disasters, including the first billion-dollar natural disaster, refocused attention from 
the existential threat of communism to the immediate threats of earthquakes, floods, and 
hurricanes.  Thus, in 1968 Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program 
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within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. With an increasingly 
professional workforce, the program began taking a strategic approach to managing flood 
risk nationwide. Throughout the 20th century, the government shifted from a flood 
prevention focus to a “flood risk reduction and mitigation”22 approach. Initially, the 
government took a structural approach to mitigation. By the end of the 20th century, non-
structural or green infrastructure approaches became more common. They often mimicked 
the nature and provided benefits along multiple dimensions, such as “erosion reduction, fish 
habitat and water quality benefits.”23 
As Michele Landis Dauber notes, disaster recovery is not commonly considered part 
of the welfare state in the United States, though many of the same considerations that apply 
to extending aid to needy citizens apply to disaster relief. She says, 
"scholars have long noted that in the American context, unlike in more egalitarian European systems, the 
welfare state takes a weak form based on classical liberalism with its reliance on markets. Universalistic 
criteria such as citizenship, status, and even need may be insufficient to determine eligibility for state 
benefits" and "the boundary between natural and man-made events has proven in practice to be of only 
secondary importance to decisions about whether to provide disaster relief."24 
The source of the disaster, in Dauber's view, is of less importance in the American context 
than the perceived responsibility of the persons seeking aid. This question of responsibility 
and worthiness requires the disaster victim to establish that their circumstances were entirely 
out of their control in order to be worthy of aid. She says, "We have one logic that sorts 
claimants into more or less generous systems depending on their ability to demonstrate that 
                                                     
22  Flood Resilience and Risk Reduction: Federal Assistance and Programs. CRS Report, 2018b). 
https://congressional.proquest.com/legisinsight?id=CRS-2018-CRS-184004&type=MISC_PUB.  
23 Ibid 6.  






their deprivation is not their own fault."25 While the two systems exist simultaneously, the 
same people can experience different outcomes based on the perceived origin of their 
distress. 
Dauber provides the example of Hurricane Katrina to demonstrate the effects of 
perception of the worthiness of disaster victims within the United States. She notes that 
"What changed with Hurricane Katrina was not the people, but their ability to portray 
themselves as the victims of circumstances beyond their control" and that Katrina showed 
"that a disaster can temporarily enable even a disadvantaged group to successfully claim 
large-scale resources while leaving undisturbed their inability to receive help for their chronic 
condition."26 The same poor black residents of New Orleans who were able to receive 
$2,000 debit cards as disaster relief were still denigrated when they were unable to bring 
themselves out of poverty despite years of welfare benefits. Portraying a disaster as natural in 
origin, despite human contributions to the events, increases the likelihood that a person will 
receive assistance in the United States. 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
A series of costly natural disasters paired with a new emphasis on environmental 
science created political conditions favorable to established the National Flood Insurance 
Program. These included several disasters in the spring of 1964, such as the Alaska 
Earthquake and Hurricane Betsy of 1965, the nation's first billion-dollar natural disaster. 
Where previously each disaster received funding on a case by case basis, the growing 
professionalization of the government workforce, focus on disaster preparedness, and 
advances in environmental science made it possible for legislators to pursue a different 
                                                     






approach. Through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 Congress sought to meet the 
following two goals:  
"1.) to provide access to primary flood insurance, thereby allowing for the transfer of some of the 
financial risk of property owners to the federal government, and 2.) to mitigate and reduce the 
nation’s comprehensive flood risk through the development and implementation of floodplain 
management standards."27  
The program was initially intended to be dynamic and change in conjunction with risk and 
the greater availability of information. In the Act, Congress justified creating the NFIP 
stating, 
"The Congress finds that (1) from time to time flood disasters have created personal hardships and economic 
distress which have required unforeseen disaster relief measures and have placed an increasing burden on the 
Nation's resources; (2) despite the installation of preventive and protective works and the adoption of other 
public programs designed to reduce losses caused by flood damage, these methods have not been sufficient 
to protect adequately against growing exposure to future flood losses; (3) as a matter of national policy, a 
reasonable method of sharing the risk of flood losses is through a program of flood insurance which can 
complement and encourage preventive and protective measures; and (4) if such a program is initiated and 
carried out gradually, it can be expanded as knowledge is gained, and experience is appraised, thus eventually 
making flood insurance coverage available on reasonable terms and conditions to persons who have need for 
such protection." (42 U.S.C. 4001 Sec. 1301) 
The federal government recognized the simultaneous need to guard against costly floods in 
the short run and comprehensively address land use and the human-made factors 
contributing to flood risk by taking a more strategic approach to the problem. The chaotic 
spending of a post-disaster period was not financially sustainable for the federal government. 
Also, there was a greater need for property owners to become aware of their risk of flood 
damage. 
The structure represents a compromise between increasing access to federally 
subsidized flood insurance, where once it was only privately available, and adequate 
floodplain management. Gilbert White headed the task force charged with investigating the 
issue before the creation of the bill and is largely credited with laying the foundation for 
taking a comprehensive approach to flood management. He was concerned with the ultimate 
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dual mandate of the program and lack of adequate emphasis on taking a holistic approach 
rather than transferring risk. He found that  
“such attention given nationally to federally subsidized flood insurance would divert attention from 
the broader goal of his task force recommendations: a ‘unified national program’ for managing not 
only flood loss/flood control but also floodplains as ecosystems.”28  
He accurately assessed the risk of examining the issue too narrowly and foresaw some of the 
problems that would arise in the future of the program. At the outset, the NFIP was a 
voluntary program that progressively began to be mandatorily applied to more properties 
through a series of legislation. In the first 30 years of the program, lawmakers strengthened 
its enforcement, the private industry received the incentive to participate in the market 
through the Write-Your-Own (WYO) program,  the Community Rating System was 
established, and the program moved from HUD to FEMA. 
1973 to Hurricane Katrina 
Throughout its first 30 years, Congress ably adjusted the NFIP to meet its intended 
purpose. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 further strengthened the NFIP. Most 
notably, the Act created mandatory coverage for borrowers in specified areas with 
heightened flood risk. What had once been an entirely voluntary program with relatively low 
take-up rates was expanded to a higher number of consumers. 
The 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act created significant changes to coverage for 
individuals and communities. Perhaps the most considerable change to the NFIP in the Act 
was the requirement that federally backed mortgages in Special Flood Hazard Areas (and 
Coastal Barrier Resource Systems through the Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982) 
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purchase flood insurance. Communities in Special Flood Hazard Areas became eligible for 
disaster assistance if they participated in the NFIP. The 1973 Act required that 
"Each Federal entity for lending regulation…shall by regulation direct regulated lending institutions not to 
make, increase, extend, or renew any loan secured by improved real estate or a mobile home located or to be 
located in an area that has been identified by the Director as an area having special flood hazards and in 
which flood insurance has been made available under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 [42 U.S.C. 
4001 et seq.], unless the building or mobile home and any personal property securing such loan is covered 
for the term of the loan by flood insurance in an amount at least equal to the outstanding principal balance 
of the loan or the maximum limit of coverage made available under the Act with respect to the particular 
type of property, whichever is less."29 
Thus the NFIP now applied to many more homeowners and provided an incentive for 
communities to engage in what had once been an entirely voluntary program. Later updates 
and reauthorizations of the program with newer mapping would allow for grandfathering of 
properties where it would otherwise be too burdensome for property owners to pay for 
flood insurance premiums. The grandfathering of the subsidy, however, would go on to 
plague the program in the future as properties in flood-prone areas or repetitive loss 
properties would drain funding from the program. 
The Reagan administration sought to increase private investment through the Write-
Your-Own (WYO) program allowing private insurance companies to write and service flood 
insurance policies and receive payment for expenses. George H.W. Bush's administration 
followed that with the creation of the Community Rating System, which rewards 
communities for their floodplain management efforts. The Clinton administration's Flood 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 furthered some of the updated provisions in the 1973 Act. 
Overall, legislators were able to successfully manage and refine the program in its first 30 
years. 
Policy Proposal 
                                                     






While the perils of sea level rise and flooding from natural disasters, such as 
hurricanes, receive much attention on the coasts, inland states face the threat of flooding as 
well. Creating a revolving loan fund for funding flood mitigation activities would be to the 
benefit of all states. Availability of the funding could create the political will for improved 
floodplain management and disaster planning.  
As the May 31st deadline approaches, so does the spring flood season. Over the past 
ten years, springtime has seen the vast majority of flood events. Most of these occurred in 
inland states. As legislators consider the reauthorization of the NFIP it is imperative that 
they consider the issue of flooding comprehensively and recognize that it occurs in many 
different types of communities across the country. 
The purpose of this policy proposal is to protect communities from the adverse 
effects of flooding over the long-run. This proposal is intended to focus on the flood 
mitigation aspects of the National Flood Insurance Program. While there are several critical 
components of the NFIP that need examination in order for the program to function in the 
future, flood mitigation has the potential to decrease costs significantly to the federal 
government over time. Investing in and emphasizing flood mitigation more firmly within the 
NFIP will ultimately make communities more resilient and save money for individual 
homeowners, business owners, state, federal, and municipal governments. This proposal 
supports H.R. 1610 the State Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund Act of 2019 co-sponsored by 
Representatives Charlie Crist (D-FL) and Roger Williams (R-TX). 
Description of the Act: 
The State Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund Act would create a partnership between 
the states and the federal government through FEMA to combat the issue of flooding. 





interest loans through their state revolving loan funds. Ultimately, the program would have 
the effect of lowering insurance premiums, protecting repetitive loss properties, and 
preparing communities before disaster strikes. The program design would be similar to the 
Clean Water State Revolving Fund of 1987 and likely to see an even higher return on 
investment. The Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) requires a 20% match from 
the states and the funds "[can] support many financial assistance options including loans, the 
purchase of debt obligations to use as pledged security for municipal bond transactions, 
financial guarantees, and investment."30  
According to Congressman Charlie Crist, over its 30-year span, the CWSRF has 
"leveraged $42 billion in federal funds for $126 billion worth of clean water infrastructure"31, 
and the flood revolving loan fund could achieve something similar. Recent research from the 
National Institute of Building Sciences shows that for every $1 of investment in hazard 
mitigation there is $6 return32. This research suggests that investment in flood mitigation 
could be an effective method of not only preparing communities but also lessening the 
burden of the costs of floods in the future. 
Existing Similar Acts: 
The proposed revolving loan fund offers an opportunity to replicate an existing, 
successful program while reducing the risk for the federal government by requiring a match 
from the states. The states would receive an incentive to prepare for disasters and consider 
                                                     
30 Céline Kauffmann, "Financing Water Quality Management," International Journal of Water Resources Development 
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their risk comprehensively by engaging in mitigation activities.  There are, however, two 
existing programs to fund mitigation activities. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and 
the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program are two such grant programs. There is the 
potential for the three programs to conflict since they would each deal with similar issues. 
The Hazard Mitigation Program, authorized under the Stafford Act of 1988, is available 
solely for post-disaster relief. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program, also authorized 
under the Stafford Act, has been perpetually underfunded. 
Cost: 
Congressman Crist sent members of Congress a Dear Colleague letter outlining the 
proposed funding structure of the program. In the letter, he proposes a cost structure for the 
program. In the letter, he says, 
“fifty-percent (50%) of the federal funds is allocated proportionately based on the 
number of NFIP policies held in each eligible state.  The other fifty-percent (50%) is 
allocated based on the relative average premium paid in each eligible state.  Any state 
that receives less than $4 million in funding is not required to establish a revolving 
loan fund, but can instead use their funding as grants for flood mitigation projects.”33  
While the cost structure for the program is outlined, no fixed sums for the total cost of the 
revolving loan fund exist. Among the states, there is no comprehensive data on how much 
each state is spending on mitigation activity.34 An understanding of each state's flood 
                                                     
33 Crist, Charlie. Dear Colleague Letter, “Boost Mitigation and Bring Down the Cost of Flood Insurance by Co-sponsoring the 
Bipartisan State Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund Act.” October 24, 2018. http://dearcolleague.us/2018/10/boost-
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mitigation spending would be needed in order to determine full costs for the program. With 
that data, the actual cost and long-term feasibility of the program could be quantified.  
Equity Issues: 
If signed into law, this bill has the potential to substantially overhaul an often 
overlooked aspect of natural disasters: mitigation. If applied equitably, it can result in safer, 
healthier, more resilient communities across the United States and Puerto Rico. However, as 
a disaster recovery tool, its application requires scrutiny. Historically, disaster recovery, 
particularly loans, have favored wealthier people and communities. That severely diminishes 
the ability of disinvested communities to recover from an individual disaster and withstand 
disasters in the future. 
Howell and Elliott find that "differential access to government assistance, differential 
disruption to housing and income, and unequal opportunities to tap into substantial flows of 
recovery capital that stream into damaged areas, regardless of whether one is immediately 
affected or not"35 significantly impact how more impoverished communities and 
communities of color rebound from natural disasters. Other disaster recovery programs 
authorized in the Stafford Act do effectively further some of this inequality in an attempt to 
mitigate fraud. A report from the New York Attorney General chronicling the aftermath of 
Superstorm Sandy found that fraud claims, however, are often related to structural issues 
with the NFIP. These include "a lack of clarity in the scope of the policy coverage," 
"inadequate training and lack of certification requirements for structural engineers," and 
                                                     







poor administration of the program.36 As a disaster recovery and preparedness program, the 
revolving loan fund would need to be structured such that it does not replicate those 
inequities. 
Policy Analysis - 
The purpose of the policy proposal is to protect communities from the adverse 
effects of flooding over the long-run. The State Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund’s 
effectiveness would be measured two-fold. The first is that it would need to demonstrate 
that the fund decreased the number of reported repetitive loss properties. Participation in 
the program would release funds into communities to engage in floodplain management 
activities, community planning, and make physical development improvements to decrease 
the impact of floods. Secondly, the program would be measured in how equitably the funds 
were distributed. While the Act is modeled after the Clean Water State Revolving Fund and 
estimated to have a $6:$1 return on investment, it is imperative that the investment does not 
exacerbate existing inequalities. 
Equitable distribution of disaster recovery funds is one of the emerging issues of 
disaster preparedness and recovery efforts. As weather-related disasters become 
simultaneously more frequent and more extreme, the insidious effects of inequality become 
more salient. Communities without adequate access to emergency services, banks, political 
institutions, safe, healthy housing, and clean water and transportation infrastructure suffer 
when tragedy strikes. Repeated disasters, such as floods, erode a community's ability to 
recover from a single event and less able to absorb external shocks over time. The State 
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Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund Act lacks an explicit focus on addressing the ways disaster 
recovery and mitigation programs can exacerbate existing inequality. 
In their 2018 white paper, Roberto Barrios and Colette Pichon Battle argue that 
disaster recovery efforts must contain specific goals to reduce long-term social inequalities. 
They say that "disaster mitigation and risk reduction must become synonymous with inequity 
reduction and equity making37 The authors argue that humans actions and systems in place 
long before disasters strike largely determine the scale of disasters. For Barrios and Battle, 
disasters are "lengthy historical processes that begin long before a hurricane makes landfall, 
or a seismic fault line releases its tension38 Because of these historical processes, the effects 
of disasters are often inequitably distributed among existing disadvantaged groups. This 
inequitable distribution increases vulnerability to future shocks and lessens resilience for 
people in these groups. 
Disaster preparedness plans and recovery processes without equity as a central goal 
risk unintentionally exacerbating these historical trends and putting vulnerable populations at 
a further disadvantage. The government response to Hurricane Katrina provides ample 
examples of inequitable response to a disaster. One such example the authors provide is of 
public housing residents forced from their homes at gunpoint and "given one-way tickets to 
cities they had never been to" while wealthier homeowners "were offered the choice of 
evacuation" and their "homes were patrolled to ensure looting and other criminal activity 
was kept to a minimum".39 
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Barrios, in his 2014 anthropological study on the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 
Southern Honduras, discusses the need for a more nuanced understanding of how the 
relationships between governments and NGO's shape the communities after disasters. 
Though communities are commonly considered static places defined by specific 
geographical boundaries, he argues that policymakers need to deepen their understanding of 
what defines a community. He says that they are " never static nor bounded…they are 
collectivities that a) are in constant state of emergence over time, and b) are shaped by 
dynamic, politically and epistemically charged relationships among assisting governments, aid 
agencies, and disaster-affected populations40 Communities have long histories and exist 
within a broader context. Power dynamics within the community and between the 
community and local, national, and international institutions affect the shaping of the 
community.  
Barrios finds that power relationships not only shape communities but can also 
determine their ability to recover from disasters.41 In essence, governments and NGO's 
responding to disasters must accept their role in the long-term development of communities 
during both the pre- and post-disaster periods. Barrios finds that "implicit conceptualizations 
of community overlook the politically and epistemically charged relationships through which 
communities and their characteristics come into being.”42 Two communities outlined in the 
study, Limon and Marcelino, demonstrate these findings.  Since Marcelino had stronger 
relationships with the local government and international organizations, it was able to 
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recover while Limon was not. In Limon, these organizations were not responsive to resident 
needs and generally ignored the social aspects of recovery.  
The Urban Institute recently undertook a study to understand how these issues of 
inequality manifest financially for people affected by natural disasters. They found that large-
scale or severe disasters garner the most attention. Consequently, they receive the most aid. 
The people who often need the most assistance in the long-run, however, are those who 
experience medium-sized disasters. They tend to live in lower-income communities and 
communities of color. This finding relates to Battle and Barrios' assertion that disasters are 
part of a historical process and the unequal distribution of effects and severity of disaster on 
different actors in society is shaped well before the disaster occurs. The Urban Institute 
report has similar findings, arguing that aid needs to be directed to these communities. 
The Urban Institute's examination of how disasters affect financial health surfaced 
four main themes. By examining credit scores, credit debt, mortgage delinquency, auto debt, 
and bankruptcies, the authors found the following: 
1.     "Disasters lead to broad, and often substantial, negative impacts on financial 
health 
2.     The negative impacts of disasters persist, or even grow over time, for important 
financial outcomes. 
3.     Medium-sized disasters, which are less likely to receive long-term public recovery 
funding, appear to lead to larger and more consistently negative effects on financial 





4.     Individuals in communities more likely to be struggling financially before disasters 
strike, such as low-income communities and communities of color, are often hardest 
hit by the disaster"43 
These findings are consistent with recent scholarship. It shows that a given community's pre-
disaster ability to absorb external shocks is a reliable indicator of how disasters will affect a 
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Financial hardships include decreased credit scores, communities of color, and timely access 
to disaster aid. Overall, they demonstrate a "pattern of results…broadly suggestive that 
disasters may be not only harmful for affected residents on average, but may also have the 
effect of widening already existing inequalities."48 
Several of the policy prescriptions from the report apply directly to the revolving 
loan fund and would increase its efficacy in combating long-term effects of disasters. These 
prescriptions include: providing communities struggling in the pre-disaster period with more 
funds, expanding access to post-disaster funds,49  and incorporating financial health into 
state and local disaster recovery plans.50 Adding these policy prescriptions into the Act 
would be consistent with its goal to increase mitigation efforts. Mitigation is ongoing work 
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rather than a one-time influx of funds. Including financial fitness courses of requirements 
into the loan process could improve financial stability in communities across the U.S. 
If well implemented, the Act would increase capacity within communities and states 
to prepare for and recover from disasters. One of its strengths is that it is built on an over 
30-year-old model that will be familiar to states. That would facilitate implementation. 
Besides, the $6:$1 return on investment will be attractive to states, since matching funds are 
required. If the Act incorporated some of the expanded understanding of communities that 
Battle and Barrios present and the policy prescriptions of the Urban Institute, it could serve 
as a model for disaster recovery programs in the future. Its model is already consistent with 
the nature of disasters; they are variable and ever-evolving. Encouraging states to build their 
internal capacity and find solutions that work for their particular conditions would ensure 
the long-term viability of the program. Additionally, states, more attuned to local conditions, 
would be able to deploy the funds more ably than the federal government. 
While the framing of the program and concept is strong, the total costs and source 
of funding are unclear. Also, the allocation of funds to the states is based on the National 
Flood Insurance Program, which greatly needs mapping updates.  According to the Act,  
"(i) Fifty percent of the total amount made available under subparagraph (A) shall be allocated so that 
each participating State receives the percentage amount that is obtained by dividing the number of 
properties that were insured under the national flood insurance program in that State in the fiscal year 
preceding the fiscal year in which the amount is allocated by the total number of properties that were 
insured under the national flood insurance program in the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which 
the amount is allocated."51 
                                                     





Using NFIP flood maps as a basis for allocating funds may not provide adequate assistance 
to areas in need. Outdated maps would create a foundation for the loan fund that does not 
accurately reflect the current or projected need. 
 Political Analysis 
As Chief of Staff to the Ranking Member Senator Sherrod Brown of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, you would be an excellent candidate to move this legislation 
forward in the Senate.  In both chambers of Congress, there exists a bipartisan effort to 
effectively deal with the problem of flooding and the growing financial burden of the NFIP 
on taxpayers. Senator Bob Menendez introduced an NFIP reform bill in the 115th Congress 
called the Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient (SAFE) National Flood Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act of 2017. This proposal promoted sweeping reforms in the 
NFIP to make it more sustainable in the long-run. Moving legislation similar to the 
legislation from the House Finance Committee forward would help the NFIP achieve more 
financial stability. 
Polling data: 
In 2017, Pew Charitable Trusts contracted with Public Opinion Strategies to conduct 
surveys on attitudes about flooding. The surveys were illuminating in many ways, including 
the finding that respondents across party lines overwhelmingly supported flood policy 
reforms. It is important to note that the polling occurred in March 2017. The was before 
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in the fall of 2017, costly disasters that put the NFIP 










The poll found a consensus among Americans that the issue of flooding needed 
reform in four key areas. The top four findings of the polls are the following: 
● "More than eight out of ten American voters support a single, national standard for disclosure of past 
flooding on a home or property during a sale. 
Fig. 7 
 
                                                     







● More than eight out of ten American voters support future federal spending on construction in flood-
prone areas is constructed to withstand the impacts of flooding better. 
● Rather than rebuilding repeatedly flooded homes, three out of four American voters support 
prioritizing those properties located in environmentally sensitive areas for relocation for willing 
homeowners so they can purchase a new home in a safer area. 
● Roughly two out of three American voters support requiring people to pay more for flood insurance 




The data show that beyond being an effective way to curb flood damage, Americans 
generally support flood mitigation as a strategy to achieve that. Notably, 80% of Americans 
support increased construction costs in flood-prone areas. About 66% of respondents 
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affirmed that owners of repetitive loss properties should pay more for their flood insurance 
if they do not make any mitigation efforts. 
Key Actors: 
The key actors in promoting this legislation are the FEMA Administrator, co-
sponsors of the House proposal, Senate Banking Committee Chair and Ranking Member, 
and Senator Bob Menendez who previously introduced legislation to address similar issues. 
Each plays a critical role in building support, momentum or consensus around the need for 
this legislation. 
FEMA 
In March 2017, the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance of the House Financial 
Services Committee held a hearing with FEMA's Deputy Administrator of Federal Insurance 
and Mitigation, Roy Wright. They asked for his perspective on mitigation activities during 
the hearing. He said that his funds are limited and mostly designated to post-disaster 
recovery. What is available for mitigation he "prioritize[d] on repetitive loss, severe repetitive 
loss all moved to the top because that benefits the fund" and that "we could do more to help 
communities if we started taking on projects that were a bit bigger at the community scale."55 
Mitigation activities, particularly of repetitive loss properties, were recognized as the best 
long-term course of action within FEMA then. 
Currently, the Acting Administrator is Pete Gaynor. According to his biography, 
before confirmation as the Acting FEMA Administrator, he was appointed the director of 
Rhode Island's Emergency Management Agency by Democratic Governor Gina Raimondo. 
That could indicate that he is willing to work with Democrats if he is not a Democrat 
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himself. He has over ten years of experience in emergency management and is a former 
Marine. 
The recent upheaval within the agency could make it challenging to implement this 
new legislation. FEMA would need to be prepared to work in concert with the states to 
make this funding available to those in need. However, the timing of when the NFIP needs 
to be reauthorized, before the end of May 2019, creates a situation in which there will likely 
be public support for such legislation. Most floods over the past ten years occurred in the 
spring, and the experience will be fresh for many constituents. The agency could support 
popular legislation and work to improve its damaged reputation after the fall 2017 disasters. 
The chief concerns for the Administrator would be how reconciling the two current 
flood mitigation and disaster preparedness programs with the revolving loan fund and 
ensuring there is adequate funding for increasingly costly natural disasters. Though the states 
will contribute matching funds, for FEMA it needs to be clear that they will have the 
funding they need to administer the NFIP as is and respond to extreme weather events of 
2019. 
House Co-Sponsors Charlie Crist (D-FL) and Roger Williams (R-TX) 
In the House of Representatives, co-sponsors of the State Flood Mitigation 
Revolving Loan Fund Act Rep. Charlie Crist (D-FL) and Rep. Roger Williams (R-TX)  are 
key political actors. Congressman Williams hails from a solidly Republican district in central 
Texas (TX-25), spanning between Austin and Dallas/Fort Worth. Conversely, Congressman 
Crist (FL-13) is from a solidly Democratic district on Florida's Gulf Coast. Though the 
districts are entirely different geographically and politically, Crist and Williams agreed that 
flood mitigation was a critical issue to pursue on behalf of their constituents. Unlike 





districts, House members cannot stray too far from the desires of their constituents. The fact 
that these members from such different districts recognize the importance of flood 
mitigation further support the survey findings that most Americans agree that flood 
mitigation is the strategy to follow to overhaul flood management. 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
The critical actors here are the Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID), Ranking 
Member Sherrod Brown (D-OH), and Sponsor of previous legislation Senator Bob 
Menendez (D-NJ). They each voted affirmatively on S. 3628 to extend the NFIP in 2018.56 
The bill originated from the Committee, sponsored by Republican  Louisiana Senator John 
Kennedy. The Banking Committee has already demonstrated strong support and leadership 
within the Senate on the issue of flooding. 
Interest Groups: 
Another set of key actors are interest groups. The State Flood Mitigation Revolving 
Fund Act has demonstrated support from over 130 industry leaders including the American 
Institute of  Architects, the National Groundwater Association, The Nature Conservancy, 
the Consumer Mortgage Coalition, and Enterprise Community Partners. In their letter of 
support, each organization affirms the need for flood mitigation flooding that is flexible, 
nimble, and adaptable to local conditions. This industry pressure to coalesce around 
mitigation as a long-term strategy could drive key policymakers in their decision processes. 
Political Likelihood and Time Horizon 
It is likely that the Act, as an amendment to the NFIP, will pass this year. The NFIP 
must be reauthorized this year, there is strong public, industry, and bipartisan support, and 
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the deadline for reauthorizing the NFIP falls squarely within the period when most flooding 
occurs. It is likely that the changes implemented as a result of this program would not have 
immediate effects for pre-disaster preparedness. Effects would likely be seen over the next 3 
to 5 years as construction projects are designed and completed. The most immediate effects 
would be for post-disaster assistance in home repair and evidence of less damage from 
flooding in the following year. 
Recommendation 
The State Flood Revolving Fund deserves your support. If implementation for the 
program includes a strong focus on equity and expanding how communities access disaster 
funds, it could significantly reduce the costs for the National Flood Insurance Program. 
Mitigation activities, specifically community planning, floodplain management, physical 
improvements to homes, and green and gray infrastructure are needed to ensure the long-
term security of communities.  
The loan fund could serve the purpose of spurring economic activity, which is 
critical in medium-and-small-disaster communities that do not commonly receive large 
influxes of federal funds. More importantly, risk management and disaster recovery hinge on 
a community's ability to establish strong relationships and lines of communications they will 
later rely on when disaster strikes. Planning and building those relationships over time is the 
difference between a community that recovers and a community that does not.  
As climate change makes extreme weather events more severe and frequent, the 
more communities will need to rely on structures put in place from mitigation activities to 
cope. A long-term, ongoing program rather than a one-time influx of funds will ensure 





As demonstrated by the recent cancelation of NFIP debt, flood insurance as 
currently configured does not work. Adequate funding for and a focus on mitigation will 
move our comprehensive risk management strategies into the future. While this revolving 
fund will not solve the entire flood insurance problem, over time, it will decrease the burden 
on the government when flood disasters occur. Mitigation is the strategy we should pursue.  
Climate change makes future disasters uncertain, and every community needs to have 
the skills to respond and adapt. Disasters have an economic toll on communities and 
condemn financially fragile or weak communities to a further decline. Mitigation will make 
homes safer, save lives, protect livelihoods, and ensure long-term adaptability in a changing 
world. Flood insurance programs are only as good as their maps are accurate and prices are 
low. Providing an incentive for people to prepare and think comprehensively about the 
flood risk in their communities, rather than merely their personal risk, will save communities 
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